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Docket No. 40882-2013 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
NEW ENERGY TWO, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, and 
NEW ENERGY THREE, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, 
Petitioner-Appellants, 
v. 
IDAHO POWER COMPANY, 
Respondent, 
v. 
IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, 
Intervenor-Respondent. 
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Appeal from the Idaho Public Utilities Commission 
Commissioner Mack A. Redford, Presiding 
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INTRODUCTION 
With due deference to Respondent and Intervenor-Respondent's appeals to public policy 
rationales and varying interpretations of case law on the issue before this Honorable Court, the 
prevailing appellate guidance squarely supports the conclusion that jurisdiction over contract 
matters no germane to the issues that the PUC is mandated by statute to adjudicate lies with the 
District Court system in the State of Idaho and not with the Idaho Public Utilities Commission 
("PUC"). While the PUC may be a convenient forum for Respondent to have these issues 
adjudicated, it has become axiomatic in this jurisdiction that the PUC's jurisdiction does not 
extend that far. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PRESENT FACTS DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN INSTANCE WHERE THE 
PUC HAS JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE THE CONTRACT DISPUTE AT ISSUE. 
Respondent properly states that this Honorable Court has set forth the general rule of 
contractual interpretation as lying within the jurisdiction of the District Court system. However, 
where Respondent's arguments diverge from the prevailing law is in its appeal to the various 
"instances" where the PUC has been able to exercise power over the interpretation of contractual 
matters. The PUC's own responsive briefing seeks to extend its authority beyond scope 
statute and interpretive guidance by to a case that have 
issues that are Fe-'" HU4HV matters 
to 
mapp,)Sll:e to reasons: 
1 
First, Respondent's reliance upon A. W Brown v. Idaho Power Co. (121 Idaho 812, 819 
(1992)) is misplaced and irrelevant to the facts that hand. The A. W Brown matter concerned a 
grievance by a potential electricity supplier, not under contract with Idaho Power, over the issue 
of whether the PUC could entertain litigation of common law contract issues between Brown and 
Idaho Power "that neither party had even pleaded." 121 Idaho at 818-819. The issue before this 
Honorable Court in the present case is quite distinct: particularly, the question of whether the 
PUC has the providence to interpret a force majeure clause in power purchase agreements 
entered into between Petitioner-Appellants and Respondent. Jurisdiction over the application of 
contract law principles has been allocated by this Honorable Court to the District Court system 
and its holding in Afton Energy, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co. (hereinafter Afton 1IIlI), 107 Idaho 781, 
784-786 (1984). No degree of arguing around the notion of exemptions can disprove that 
principle. 
Second, Respondent's reliance upon this Honorable Court's holding in McNeal v. Idaho 
Public Utilities Commission (142 Idaho 685, 689 (2006)) is equally misplaced. Petitioner-
Appellants have addressed the scope of the holding in McNeal in its Opening Brief. See 
Petitioner-Appellants' Opening Brief at p. 4. McNeal's holding identified the general principle 
that limited exceptions expanding the PUC's jurisdiction do indeed exist if issues "out of the 
norn1," Idaho at . However, as argued previously, 
specific acknowledgment is not a "court"; 
v~n"Hu"n0,J'VH IS an arm not a comi 
are no are pvlfr",~ ... rI 
or "out of the norm" in the facts of this case. The matter at issue is one of the applicability of 
force majeure doctrines to the ability of Petitioner-Appellants to perform under a power supply 
agreement. Such issues are, again, reserved for the District Court. Accordingly, the PUC cannot 
transform itself into a court of justice in the absence of statutory authority allowing it to do so by 
declaring the situation is one over which it may preside: a position that, albeit dressed up in 
dozens of pages of briefing, is exactly one Respondent and the PUC has taken in this matter. 
Third, Respondent's attempts to bootstrap the PUC's ruling on whether it had jurisdiction 
through the interpretation of the Afton case progeny is unavailing and self-serving as it is the 
very ruling that is at issue before this Honorable Court. A judicial body's lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction cannot be waived; parties cannot consent to an assumption of jurisdiction. United 
States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 63 (2002). This Honorable Court has long since relied upon this 
principle. In Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624 (1978), it noted that the general 
concept of " jurisdiction" is very broad and has many facets, and it then warned: "[B]ecause of 
the serious ramifications and consequences which could follow from a court acting without 
jurisdiction over the subject matter, we recognize that it is important to keep that concept clearly 
defined." fd. at 626. The relevance of this argument pertains to Respondent and Intervenor-
Respondent's reliance upon the "Consent Exception" rule that Respondent cites to is predicated 
11 925 986)) and references 
v. Washington Water Power 249, 252 
(1 was 
matter is an not 
3 
an abrogation of a contractual agreement." Id. Furthermore, the agreement of the parties the 
present case to resolve disputes relating to the contract before the PUC does not deprive the 
District Court of jurisdiction over the issue in dispute. Petitioner-Appellants and Respondent's 
energy sales agreement provide for continuing jurisdiction of the Commission to adjudicate "the 
rates, terms and conditions contained in this Agreement." See Tr. Vol. I, p. 63, and Vol. III, p. 
549. The scope of this provision does not confer the PUC with jurisdiction to determine 
whether facts constituting a force majeure scenario exist or do not exist. Furthermore, the 
dispute resolution provisions of the parties' energy sales agreements, which are conveniently 
misconstrued by Respondent in an attempt to advance its position (See Tr. Vol. I, p. 70, and Vol. 
III, p. 556), do not confer the PUC with jurisdiction any more than the provision agreeing to 
continue the PUC's jurisdiction cited to above. Equally unavailing is the PUC's arguments 
(asserted in its responsive briefing at pp. 26-28) that Petitioner-Appellants' analysis of the Idaho 
Power Co. v. Cogeneration cases is misplaced. The PUC has asserted that because this 
Honorable Court "never reached the issue" of jurisdiction over force majeure issues, the consent 
exception argument nullifies Petitioner-Appellants' arguments. This is simply not the case. The 
Cogeneration matters provide support for the notion that the District Court system has 
jurisdiction over such matters. Simply because the PUC chose to take a position in those matters 
was consistent the prevailing delineation of jurisdiction does 
not jurisdiction to begin and not 
matters as 
Fourth and finally, this Honorable Court's ruling in a secondary Bunker Hill proceeding 
(101 Idaho 493 (1980») applied the principles articulated in Lemhi Telephone Co. v. Mountain 
Slates Tel. & Tel. Co., (98 Idaho 692 (1977»), which were identified in Petitioner-Appellants' 
Opening Brief, clearly identified the subtle yet pivotal distinction that this Honorable Court is 
asked to reaffirm through the present appeal: 
"'[T]he parties' dispute arises from differing constructions and 
interpretations of the contract rights of the parties. While one of the parties is 
a public utility, and while the general area of power supply may be one in which 
the Commission is presumed to have expertise, nevertheless, the matter remains 
a contractual dispute involving the legal interpretation of a contract which 
historically lies within the jurisdiction of the courts. Hence, no jurisdiction is 
vested in the Public Utilities Commission and the refusal of the Commission to 
grant Bunker Hill's motion to dismiss was error." 
10 1 Idaho at 494. Regardless of whether the parties agreed to have the rates and terms of their 
agreements resolved by the PUC, the conflicting interpretations of facts bearing on a legal 
principle of contractual interpretation (i.e., force majeure) lies beyond the scope of both the 
ability of the parties to confer jurisdiction upon the PUC by contract and the ability of the PUC 
to exercise its jurisdiction beyond its statutory mandates. The parties cannot contract in a 
manner contrary to those mandates, nor can the PUC take it upon itself to metamorphosize itself 
into a court oflaw. 
II. CONCERNING RATEMAKING 
5 
Respondent and Intervenor-Respondent both seem to be laboring under the 
misapprehension that the Idaho Code and federal PURP A regulations provide a medium for 
giving the PUC jurisdiction akin to that of the District Court. Such a proposition is not correct 
and, more relevant, not supported by any legal principal. 
First, the mandate of the PUC as expressed in Idaho Code Section 61-501 grants 
authority to the PUC. However, the appellate guidance that clarifies the authority conferred by 
statute and the provisions of the Idaho Code cited to by Respondent do not broaden the scope of 
the PUC's jurisdiction to the issue before this Honorable Court. The principle of ejusdem 
generis has particular applicability to the facts at hand. 1 The category of disputes that are within 
the adjudicatory realm of the PUC cannot be widened to the convenience of the parties. It is 
true that the PUC has authority to adjudicate rate disputes. It is true that the PUC has authority 
to implement state and federal statutory mandates governing utilities issues. It is also true that 
contract disputes pertaining to the subject-matter contemplated by those statutory mandates may 
be heard by the PUC. The statutory authority cited to by Respondent confmns this. However, 
none of these notions are at issue or in dispute in this matter. What Respondent and Intervenor-
Respondent appear to ignore is that it is not true that the PUC can assume the mantle of a court 




of law and adjudicate matters concerning differing positions as to the applicability of contract 
principles that fall outside the PUC's ability. The PUC's own failure to identify authority 
supporting its position vis-a-vis the specific issue of applying force majeure analyses to the 
contract at hand is telling: such matters are for the District Court system and the PUC cannot 
claim extra-territorial jurisdiction over such issues. This Honorable Court is again urged to 
consider its holding in Afton II/III (supra, 107 Idaho at 784-786) in that the ministerial powers of 
implementation of federal and state mandates does not make the PUC into more than it can be. 
Additionally, the public policy arguments in favor of conserving judicial resources, 
advanced primarily by Intervenor-Respondent in its briefing (see, e.g., PUC's Brief at pp. 28-
29), are completely irrelevant to the issue at hand. It may be a convenient thing for Respondent 
or the PUC to retain entertainment of a force majeure issue within the confines of the PUC, but 
the law does not extend the confines of that jurisdiction to such a point. Appeals to how public 
policy favors resolution of disputes are unavailing for the simple fact that the PUC cannot extend 
its jurisdiction and the appellate guidance cited by all parties in the course of briefing this matter 
cannot be alchemized to give the PUC jurisdiction it cannot have. 
CONCLUSION 
Again, Respondent cannot endow the PUC 




jurisdiction that it does not, and cannot, 
a court law because 
its 
7 
the contractual issues and directing that the matter be referred to the appropriate division of the 
District Court for further adjudication. 
DATED: 17 December 2013 Respectfully Submitted, 
Angelo L. Rosa 
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellants, 
New Energy Two, LLC and New Energy Three, 
LLC 
8 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on 18 December 2013, I caused a true and correct copy ofthe 
document herein by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Donald D. Howell, ISB # 3366 
D. Neil Price, ISB #6864 
IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0074 
(208) 334-0312 Tel. 
(208) 334-0314 Fax. 
Donovan Walker, ISB #5921 
IDAHO POWER COMPANY 
1221 West Idaho Street 
P.O. Box 70 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
(208)388-5317 Tel. 
(208) 388-6936 Fax. 




r;,;; Electronic Mail 
U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
i;,j Hand Delivered 
Overnight Courier 
Facsimile 
i;,j Electronic Mail 
Angelo L. Rosa 
9 
